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USE OF THE PROBLEM METHOD FOR TEACHING LEGAL
ETHICS
THOMAS D. MORGAN*

Underlying the 1997 W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on the
Teaching of Legal Ethics was the premise that we can distinguish among several possible purposes for teaching what we call
professional responsibility or legal ethics. First, we might be
teaching students the law governing their professional practice-both rules that are arbitrary but relatively clear and those
that have less well-defined boundaries. Second, we might be
trying to help students think more clearly about ethical decisions-both decisions in resolving individual questions and larger decisions about how to commit their professional time. Third,
we might be sensitizing students to broader issues of law and
justice-both the impact of the way they conduct their practice
and the impact the broader legal system has on different groups
within our society.
Asked which of these purposes the various possible approaches to teaching legal ethics best serve, my view is that unless a
methodology allows a law teacher to serve all of them well, the
methodology is suspect. The purposes are not alternatives. Together, they make up the whole package each of us should be
trying to construct.
This Article discusses the problem method for teaching legal
ethics.1 Although no consensus definition of that method exists,
it is understood widely to be the use of hypothetical fact situations as the centerpiece for student analysis and discussion.'
The problems typically present plausible fact situations of vary-

* Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust & Trade Regulation Law, The George
Washington University Law School.
1. See Gregory L. Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 654, 654-57 (1984) (explaining the problem method and evaluating its advantages relative to the case method).
2. See id. at 654-55.
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ing detail and complexity.3 Students then select a course of conduct or predict a court's decision based on a variety of legal and
nonlegal materials either provided to the students or readily
available to them.4
I have used this approach to teaching professional responsibility for over twenty years, and Professor Ronald D. Rotunda and
I have constructed teaching materials that have tried to make
the methodology accessible to others.5 Ron Rotunda and I began
teaching legal ethics in 1974, the year the American Bar Association (ABA) first mandated the teaching of legal ethics.6 We did
not begin our careers in teaching expecting to teach ethics. Instead, we were simply the most junior members of the faculty at
the University of Illinois, and we took on a field in which no one
else was an expert. We did so with enthusiasm. Legal ethics
appeared to be a field in which most everyone was at the starting line at about the same time.7 We believed relative newcomers like us might actually have an impact.
Our strategy of using problems to teach the new course was
very basic. To us, the first challenge any new required course
faced was credibility among students. We believed that students
should view professional responsibility as dealing with problems
that they might actually experience. Centering class discussions
around the students visualizing themselves in practice settings
seemed to achieve that goal.

3. See id. at 655-56.
4. See id.
5. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS

ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (6th ed. 1995).
6. See AMERICAN BAR ASSWN, APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND RULES
OF PROCEDURE 7 (1973); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 31, 39 & n.38 (1992) (citing ABA Standards for the Approval of Law
Schools, specifically Standard 302(a)(iii) (1974)).

7. Teaching materials generally available in 1974 were limited to two case books,
MAYNARD E. PIRSIG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed.
1970), and SAMUEL D. THURMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1970). Two texts were also available, L. RAY PATTERSON & ELLIOTr E.
CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW (1971), and DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973). We learned later that Professor Robert Mathews had
utilized the problem method in a "problem-book" first published by the American Bar
Center in 1965. See ROBERT E. MATHEWS, PROBLEMS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION vii, ix (rev. ed. 1968).
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In addition, we recognized that many ethics classes would be
taught or cotaught by adjunct faculty. Indeed, in our first courses, we invited local lawyers to coteach each class session. The
use of problems focused the discussion and kept random war
stories from dominating the visitors' contributions. We designed
each problem to make particular ethical issues seem real to our
visitors, and through them, to our students.
Foundation Press was willing to take a chance on our materials, and our strategies proved to be well chosen.8 In a 1977 survey conducted for the National Conference on Teaching Professional Responsibility, a total of sixty-two percent of the responding law schools reported that they utilized the problem method
in one or more of their classes.' Our own materials appealed to
a large number of regular and adjunct professors, ° and other
books used problems as a large part of their own approach to
teaching professional responsibility."

8. Foundation Press published the first edition of the Morgan and Rotunda text
book in 1976. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1976).
9. See Stuart C. Goldberg, 1977 National Survey on Current Methods of Teaching
Professional Responsibility in American Law Schools, in TEACHING PROFESSIONAL
RESPQNSIBILITY: MATERIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 21,
42-43 (Patrick A. Keenan ed., 1979). Some 50% of schools reported that they used
the Socratic method for teaching legal ethics, and 47% reported use of the lecture
method. See id. at 42. Because many schools utilized a variety of teaching methods,
these figures cumulatively exceed 100%. See id. Professor John Strait of Seattle
University presented a paper at the conference on teaching by the problem method.
See John A. Strait, Scenarios and Problems as a Method for Teaching Conceptual
Problems in Professional Responsibility, in TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
supra, at 147.
10. The same 1977 study showed our book in use at 48 law schools, or 31% of
those reporting. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 44. That adoption rate was almost
double the number of adoptions of the next most popular book. See id.
11. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1976);
NORMAN REDLICH, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PROBLEM APPROACH (1976). The
total number of books whose titles call attention to their problem format is now up
to eight. See ROBERT H. ARONSON ET AL., PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 1995); ROBERT P. BURNS ET AL., EXERCISES
AND PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994); NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION (1996); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS (4th ed.
1995); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (3d ed.
1989); MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 5; NORMAN REDLICH, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PROBLEM APPROACH (2d ed. 1983); MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, PROBLEMS IN
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This Symposium challenged us to take a fresh look at each of
the possible strategies for teaching professional responsibility.
The request was timely. Legal ethics teaching is no longer in its
infancy. Some students still may not like to be required to take
the legal ethics course, but few students deny its importance.'
I count about thirty sets of teaching materials available today,
each claiming to embody the best way to teach legal ethics. 3
This number may suggest a great dispersion among the ways
the subject is taught or at least dissatisfaction with the materials others have prepared, but I conclude that, although our rea-

LEGAL ETHICS (4th ed. 1997).
12. A recent article, however, described legal ethics as "an unloved orphan of legal
education" and reported that many believe "the subject is unteachable or .. . not
worth teaching." Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145, 146-47 (1996).
13. See ARONSON, supra note 11; BURNS, supra note 11; ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR.
& TERESA S. COLLETT, CASES & MATERIALS ON THE RULES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1996); DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, LAWYERS AND FUNDAMENTAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1995); VERN COUNTRYMAN ET AL., THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY (2d ed.
1976); CRYSTAL, supra note 11; ELIZABETH DvORKIN ET AL., BECOMING A LAWYER: A
HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981);
GILLERS, supra note 11; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING (2d ed. 1994); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE
LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (3d ed. 1994); PHILIP B.
HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES (1988); KAUFMAN, supra note 11; MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS:
JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE (1994); HOWARD LESNICK, BEING A
LAWYER: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1992);
DAVID MELLINKOFF, LAWYERS AND THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE (1976); JAMES E.
MOLITERNO & JOHN M. LEVY, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER'S WORK (1993); MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 5; L. RAY PATTERSON & THOMAS B. METLOFF, LEGAL ETHICS:
THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (3d ed. 1989); MAYNARD E. PIRSIG &
KENNETH E. KIRWIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (4th
ed. 1984); PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ANTHOLOGY (Thomas B. Metzloff ed., 1994);
REDLICH, supra note 11; DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS
BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (1994); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL
ETHICS (2d ed. 1995); SCHWARTZ, supra note 11; THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TExT, READINGS & DISCUSSION TOPICS (1985); THOMAS L. SHAFFER &
ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994); ROY
D. SIMON, JR. & MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1994); JOHN FLOYD SUTTON, JR. & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS (1989);
RICHARD C. WYDICK & REX R. PERSCHBACHER, CALIFORNIA LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed.
1997); RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE
OF LAW (1995).
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sons for selecting the problem method were initially unsophisticated, the use of problems remains the best single method for
effectively teaching professional responsibility.
The problem method, of course, did not originate in the rush
to produce books on legal ethics. Over a half-century ago, Legal
Realists seized upon the use of problems as a way to help break
the hold that case study had upon legal education. In the early
1940s, the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) reported
on the use of the problem method, 14 and Professor David
Cavers separately advocated its use." In advocating the problem method, Cavers wrote: "[Wihat the problem method can do
is to give the student an opportunity to learn law by using it." 6
The problem method's idea of "using" law while studying law addresses concerns about the dangers of an overly theoretical education that neglects the more practical elements of law practice.' The early Realists attempted to use their method as a
complement to the casebook system, one that could take students beyond mere adherence to legal authorities.
The Legal Realists were right. The proble'm method, like the
case method, helps put a human face on legal issues. Both cases
and problems are concrete and open to more nuanced discussion
than a discussion of rules in the abstract. Unlike cases, however,
problems do not come with authoritative answers.' 9 Students,

14. See COMiTTEE ON TEACHING AND EXAMINATION METHODS, ASS'N OF AM. L.

SCHS., Report on Suggested Procedures for Small Classes, in HANDBOOK OF THE AsSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 86, 86-90 (1942).
15. See David F. Cavers, In Advocacy of the Problem Method, 43 COLUM. L. REV.
449 (1943).
16. Id. at 455.
17. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
907, 921 (1933) (arguing that law schools should do more to integrate law teaching
with law practice). Although Judge Frank did not directly embrace the problem
method, he did promote "first-hand observations of the ways in which the ethical
problems of the lawyer arise." Id at 922. For a more recent discussion of the need
for less theory and more practical skills training, see William R. Trail & William D.
Underwood, The Decline of Professional Legal Training and a Proposal for its Revitalization in Professional Law Schools, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 201, 222-23 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Cavers, supra note 15, at 453 (discussing Realists' tactic of working
their material into the existing casebook system and adding references to nonlegal
authorities).
19. Karl Llewellyn saw the similarity between the problem method and the case
method:
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thus, are not passive receptors of the wisdom of the past. They can
be participants in determining both what the law is and what a
well-functioning justice system would dictate the result should be.
Last year in this Review, Professors Roger Cramton and Susan
Koniak considered the case and problem methods of teaching legal
ethics and argued that the use of anything other than cases would
"reinforce students' perception of legal ethics as a marginal, ghettoized subject.... [Students] are less likely to take seriously instruction that does not use rigorous and familiar teaching methods." ° In my view, that argument is nonsense. Courses in business planning and estate planning have been around for years.
Such courses use the problem method to cut across traditional
subject matter divisions. Professors ask students to apply diverse
legal and nonlegal materials to devise a practical solution to a
hypothetical client's problem. Problems in this setting are a classic way to teach sophisticated principles of substantive law to our
most advanced students.
The use of problems to teach legal ethics arises out of this same
tradition. Teachers using the problem method focus as much on
the context in which issues arise as those who use the case method. The problem method does not ignore cases, statutescor lawyer
codes; it calls upon them all. It does not give one set of sources a
higher place than another. For example, it does not privilege the
language of the ABA Model Rules over legislation or court decisions. The problem method requires students to think about the
law and ethics of lawyering using whatever sources may be relevant. In short, it teaches law by using problems as a means of
integrating diverse materials in exactly the way any practicing
lawyer must do.

[I]t is not the judicial decision which is the essence of the "case"; it is
instead the concrete problem-raising situation--so that, as I see it, any
introduction of the so-called "problem method" into law teaching is really
but an expansion of the essential merits of case-teaching, an expansion
obscured only by a current mis-emphasis upon the idea of a "case" as
being at best the official report of a judicially decided cause.
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, in EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBIL'TY 101, 109-10 (1948), quoted in Benjamin J. Naitove, Medicolegal Education and the Crisis in InterpersonalRelations, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 293,
311-12 (1982).
20. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 12, at 177.
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Furthermore, problems help students see issues that might
not be obvious at first glance or that cases may not have raised.
Law schools sometimes help students develop moral callouses-analytic barriers to students' reliance on personal moral
reactions to situations.2 1 Even persons who retain moral sensibilities often find those sensibilities inadequate to predict what
conduct professionals will find objectionable. Problems put students in new hypothetical situations in the hope that students
will develop sensitivity to ethical ambiguity and discover the
resources for confronting the unknown situations they inevitably
will face later in their careers.
The term "problem method," though, does not describe a unitary phenomenon or even a single teaching strategy. One use of
problems-a very helpful use, but one easily caricatured-is to
pose quandaries from which students must extricate themselves.
Often a problem presents multiple options, none of which is
wholly satisfactory. The prospective client puts the still-loaded
murder weapon on the lawyer's desk, for example. May she take
it and hide it? Must she tell the client to take it back? If she
gives it back, must she tell the client not to throw it in the river? May she take the gun so that the client finds it harder to
make her his next victim? If she does take possession of the gun,
must she then take it to the police? 2
Such questions are fun to discuss, and the answers are not
easy. They help students learn to integrate what the law and
their conscience require of them. In addition, they prompt students to come up with a practical plan for dealing with the situation posed in the problem. Even though solving concrete problems may not be the only useful approach to thinking about
moral philosophy," the ability to exercise practical judgment
clearly should be one of the objectives of a course in professional
responsibility.
Dramatic issues of life and death, however, do not walk into

21. See, e.g., Andrew S. Watson, The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An Educational
Deficiency Disease, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 442 (1974).
22. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 347.
23. Michael Kelly, for example, writes: "This way of thinking about ethics as discrete decision making based on concepts and rules has come under attack by such
modem Aristotelians as Alasdair MacIntyre (1984)." KELLY, supra note 13, at 224.
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most lawyers' offices every day. If the problem method only
consisted of bizarre quandaries, its critics would be justified in
criticizing it for dealing in peripheral issues.' Most professional responsibility questions are far more mundane, and if students believe ethical issues arise only in extreme forms, then
they might well overlook common, significant, but wholly undramatic events.
Furthermore, hypothetical problems inevitably abstract from
real life some important aspects of any lawyer's decision-making
process. Michael Kelly argues that problems "leave[] out a crucial component of all decisions: the constraint or guide of what
could be called ambition, or a life plan or career concept. A
person's sense of place and future in a practice organization is
enormously influential in decision making by lawyers."' I
agree that many concrete realities affect any real lawyer's decisions, realities that tend to be abstracted out of reported cases
as well. An experienced professor using the problem method,
however, can vary the facts of the problem to introduce as many
additional issues as the class has time to address.
Professor James Moliterno has criticized the problem method
for being incapable of providing a balanced picture of law practice. In addition to raising legal issues, he says, good ethics
teaching
must be balanced by at least equal treatment of a truer picture of what ethics mean to lawyers day in 'and day out.
Failure to balance will lead students to the conclusion that
the ethics of a lawyer's life involve either a technical skill of
identifying the problem and locating its proper resolution in
the rules or a hopeless daily diet of unresolvable dilemmas to
which every possible answer is as harmful as every other....
[Miost of the relevance of ethics to lawyers lies in the an-

24. The lawyer's life is not a series of dilemmas that present themselves by
way of short vignettes. Presenting the ethics course as such a series of
problems misleads the student into thinking that ethics are a set of rules
for resolving a finite list of the problems that lawyers face.
James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Lost
Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L. REV.
83, 107-08 (1991).
25. KELLY, supra note 13, at 224.
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swers to day-to-day questions of how to live life-apparently
small things that are really the biggest things, like, "how will
I treat my clients?", or "where do 'honesty' and 'care' fit in my
daily dealings with others?" The answers to these questions
can only be developed by students when they deal with the
lawyer-experiential aspects of the ethics-legal profession field,
little of which can be treated effectively by the abstract problem method.26
Again, in large part, I agree. I do not assert that clinics
should be closed or that no method other than the use of problems should be used to teach professional responsibility. The use
of nontraditional teaching materials in law school classes in
recent years, however, has given us richly nuanced problems for
analysis and discussion, which has enriched greatly the reality
of the problem method. Movies, television programs, filmed
vignettes, short stories, biographies, and novels have all been
sources of insight for the ethics teachers and their classes."
Much as I would like everyone to use the Morgan and Rotunda
teaching materials, I have to acknowledge that we have not
written all the good problems for class discussion. But
I must
protest if, as others evaluate the problem method, they ignore
the wealth of rich and complex stories available and thereby
assign the problem method a marginal role in the teaching of
legal ethics.
In short, the problem method places students, at least hypothetically, in the role of a lawyer. Clinical courses do that as
well, of course, but even clinical training, like most of the rest of
a law student's education, necessarily tends to focus on the concerns of clients. A problem-based course can shift the focus to
the student and reinforce the fact that legal ethics is about the
kind of person the student will become.
A lawyer lives and acts within a web of relationships-with

26. Moliterno, supra note 24, at 108 (footnotes omitted).
27. For a bibliography of such materials, see Deborah L. Rhode, Annotated Bibliography of Educational Materials on Legal Ethics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 361. For an unusually rich recent collection of short stories
that might be used in legal ethics classes, see LAWRENCE J. Fox, LEGAL TENDER: A.

LAWYER'S GUIDE TO HANDLING PROFESSIONAL DILEMIAS (1995).
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clients certainly, but also with partners, judges, family, support
staff, and friends. Problems let students see themselves as having responsibilities to persons in each of these groups. Problems
let students explore alternative ways of acting in a setting that
is more flexible than the case method, yet one that permits them
to make fundamental mistakes without the consequences such
exploration could have in a clinical setting.
The problem method of teaching legal ethics has as its counterpart the use of simulation in skills training. Clinical teachers
have disputed at length the relative merits of simulation and liveclient clinics.' I will not take up that debate here. We have long
known, however, that simulation allows us to place students in
sophisticated situations that only occasionally occur in real clinics. Problems give students a similar chance to put their hearts
and souls into what seems a good approach to a matter and then
to review what they have done and start over if their first approach proves ineffective. The problem method gives both professors and students the freedom to raise complex issues and the
freedom to explore what may turn out to be blind alleys.
To me, the most serious difficulty in using the problem method is that issues of broad importance can get lost in the details
of a problem. The professor must make a special effort to help
students see issues in a wider public context than their own
experiences or the facts that a given problem reveals. The Morgan and Rotunda materials use a problem based on what we
understand to be a real incident in which a lawyer working on
settlement of a disability insurance claim learned that the victim of a rape had unintentionally-but almost certainly-accused the wrong African American man of the crime.2 9
The man was serving a long prison term, and the lawyer could
not get the prosecutor, defense counsel, or trial judge to reopen
the case. ° Relatively few technical rules are raised by this
problem, but the facts can be the basis for a discussion of racism
in general, the problem of the disinclination of some to believe

28. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 17, at 907 (arguing that simulations are inferior

to clinics).
29. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 408.
30. See id. at 409.
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rape victims, and the anguish- of dealing with a system that
cannot or will not respond to a concrete case of injustice. My
point is not that other teaching methodology could not address
such issues well. It is simply that the problem method is another approach to create a context in which to discuss some of
society's toughest issues."i
Returning to the purposes of the course identified at the outset of this Article, I believe the use of problems can be an excellent way to teach the law of lawyering. It can help students see
the impact of law and lawyers on social issues and help them
develop a sense of what it means to be a moral person who is
accountable to others. That accomplishment is not bad for a twoor three-credit course! Indeed, I do not know any other teaching
methodology that can teach as much about professional responsibility so well.

31. If a professor's objective is to get students to reflect on principles of moral
philosophy writ large, however, then the problem method may not be an effective
teaching methodology. Problems are typically too concrete for abstract philosophical
analysis. Although some professors may find this fact bothersome, I simply have concluded that the teaching of moral philosophy in general-as opposed to in the professional context--is not the central purpose of the legal ethics course.

